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Saturday, August 30, 2014

google's decade

The decade ago
On 18 August 2004 a not-so obscure company came out with its first time public offer of 22.53 m Class A shares at a price of $85 per share. Of this 14.14 m shares were sold by the company and the remaining 8.39 shares were sold by the selling shareholders, making the offer one of the biggest in history in dollar terms. The company collected $1.2 b in cash. The rest as they say is history. 

Google Inc. was incorporated in 1998. As the company itself puts it, Google is a global technology leader focused on improving the ways people connect with information. The mission is to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful. 

The decade after

Well, it looks like so far it has lived up to all that is said. Market value of its equity stands over $385 b today.

Google basically derives most of its revenues from online advertising. Other revenues consist of non-advertising revenues including licensing, hardware and digital content. 

Google's revenue has increased from $3.2 b (2004) to $59.8 b (2013) and operating income from $840 m to $13.9 b.



Revenue composition in 2013 was as follows:


For Google, operating margin on advertising revenues are higher than on other revenues.


Return on capital has come down to a more reasonable 42.86% in 2013.




Pretax operating margin is steady at 23.34% (2013).



Google's share in international market has only increased. Now its revenues outside of the US is 54%.


Pretax income from domestic operations was $5.8 b and from foreign operations was $8.7 b in 2013.


Revenues
Most of its customers pay Google on a cost-per-click basis (Google AdWords), i.e. the customer (advertiser) pays only when a user clicks on one of its ads. 

There are also cost-per-impression revenues where advertisers pay Google based on the number of times their ads display on its websites and Google Network Members’ websites. 

Google distributes its advertisers’ AdWords ads for display on Google Network Members’ websites through its online program, Google AdSense. These revenues are recognized on a gross basis because Google considers that it is the primary obligor to its advertisers.

Revenues are poised to grow in future as online commerce takes off.

Operating margins and return on capital
We can expect its operating margins and return on capital to come down slowly in the next decade before they reach to more sustainable figures. How about 20% margin and 15% return on capital?

The cash.......trapped
Google has been hoarding cash big time. As of December 2013 it had cash of $58.7 b.




It can do a lot of things with that cash. It can buy Twitter for $30 b and LinkedIn for $27 b, or it can buy Tesla for $33 b. It is not likely, though.

As of that date, $33.6 b of cash was held by its foreign subsidiaries and was considered trapped, as this cash cannot be used for paying dividends, doing stock buy-backs or investments in US. Unless of course the differential tax (between tax rate where it was earned and the US tax rate) is paid on that cash before bringing it to the US. This is thanks to the US tax code.

Nevertheless, Google does not consider the cash as trapped because it wants to permanently reinvest outside of the US and its current plans do not demonstrate a need to repatriate them to fund its US operations.

This is a clever way of saying unless you change the tax code we will keep cash outside. Too many US firms are behaving in a similar manner of late as too many of them keep generating more cash outside of the US. The debate over being patriotic or just rational is getting hotter today.

Acquisitions and goodwill
Google has done a number of acquisitions over the decade; a cumulative $20 b of cash has been spent.

Click Holding Corp. (DoubleClick), a company that offers online ad serving and management services to advertisers, ad agencies and web site publishers, was acquired in March 2008 for $3.2 b of which $2.3 b was attributed to goodwill.


Motorola was acquired in 2012 for $9.6 b (net of cash taken over) which resulted in $2.5 b of goodwill. Motorola Home was sold in April 2013 for $2.5 b to Arris Group Inc. including a 7.8% ownership in Arris, and Motorola Mobility was sold in January 2014 for $2.9 b to Lenovo including some shares in Lenovo.



It is clear that Motorola was not the right candidate for synergy benefits.

The carrying value of goodwill is expected to generate cash flows of at least $11.5 b in terms of present value. Otherwise, it will be considered impaired, i.e. Google overpaid for its acquisitions.

Voting powers and control - Is it a fair deal, who cares?
Google has more than one class of shares. Class A shares with voting rights and traded, Class B shares with significant voting rights and not traded, and Class C shares without any voting rights (except as required by applicable law) and traded.

As of December 2013, approximately 92.2% of Class B shares beneficially belonged to Larry PageSergey Brin, and Eric Schmidt, which translates into approximately 61.7% of the voting power. 


In April 2014, stock dividends in the form of Class C shares were distributed (1:1 ratio) to the holders of Class A and Class B common stock. 

As of June 2014, there were 675.91 m common shares were outstanding.



It is very clear who controls Google, and if there are any further doubts, it is cleared in the form of the power of the board to issue, without stockholder approval, preferred stock with voting or other rights or preferences that could block any attempts of hostile acquisition. 

There is no chance that any outside shareholder would be able to influence corporate decisions at Google. None.



The next decade
Google is in a good position to take its best steps forward. As online business expands and emerging markets open up, there are immense opportunities to grow both in terms of size and value. Google has been reinvesting earnings back in its business with average reinvestment rate of 50.75%. It has also been spending sizable amounts on research and development each year.

How much it will grow in value in the next decade will depend upon how much revenues it will generate, how much it will earn in terms of operating margin and return on capital, how much reinvestment it will make, and the odds of making it.

Who wins this online warfare ultimately is any body's guess. However, as long as Google does not do anything stupid with its large cash the odds appear to be in its favor.

Will it live up to its current story line? Again as Google itself puts it, its business is characterized by rapid change and converging, as well as new and disruptive, technologies.

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

alibaba, the giant virtual mall

Gigantic initial offering
Shopping is becoming more technology-driven and purchases easier than before. As e-commerce expands over the globe and gives a platform for buy-and-sell the traveling costs should become lower. Delivery of goods and transfer cash where needed is only a matter of a click. When billions of people are becoming shopping-spree why not some of them become supply-spree? The sum of all activities engaged in business that is taking place online is poised to be gigantic. 

Alibaba group is one such big supplier who wants to get bigger. In May 2014, it filed its registration documents to go public in the US. With an estimated $20 b of capital raising it is touted to be one of the biggest IPOs in American history. 


Will investors buy into the Alibaba story? To check that let's have some background about the business

The tangled web of Alibaba 
Alibaba group is a huge shopping complex, a fairly large internet search engine (competing with Google), and a not-so-small bank all bundled together. 


The timeline:


  • Taobao Marketplace - online shopping;
  • Tmall - third-party platform for brands and retailers;
  • Juhuasuan -  group buying marketplace;
  • Alibaba.com - online wholesale marketplace;
  • AliExpress - global consumer marketplace;
  • Alipay - payment and escrow services for buyers and services;
  • Cloud computing services.

Alibaba and online China:


The players and the platform:




Logistics:


The story behind the pitch
Gross market value of merchandise sold on Alibaba's websites (GMV) is reported to be $248 b which is much higher than Amazon ($100 b) and eBay ($76 b) combined.


Of this, $37 b GMV came from mobile users.


That makes Alibaba the largest online and mobile commerce company in the world in terms of GMV. And the pitching does not stop.



The billionaires in the making
After the listing the current shareholders are likely to become wealthier by far.


It must have cost $280 m for Softbank to claim 34% ownership in Alibaba. For Yahoo it cost nothing to retain its shareholding because it collected much more from part sale of its stake than what it paid for the entire stake.

The tangled web of legal structure and contractual agreements
Because China has restrictions on direct foreign ownership the way is worked around such that laws are not compromised. These agreements in effect transfer most economic risks and rewards related to the business to the investors.



Composition of revenues
Alibaba primarily gets revenues from online advertisement and commissions; it also earns from fees, value-added services and cloud computing services.

A significant portion of revenues comes from online China.



Value of Alibaba
If Alibaba has to achieve what it aims to achieve success of this IPO is crucial. That means investors will have to buy into the story said so far.

Value of Alibaba is dependent upon its ability to monetize large online market and online consumer base of China in particular, and global in general. In effect it has the task on hand to convert market into market share, market share into revenues, revenues into operating profits, and finally operating profits into free cash flows. Can Alibaba pull it off?

The market for e-commerce has been enormous, and showing enormous potential for growth. If the following has to be believed, Alibaba had 83.76% (RMB 1,542 b) market share of the total China e-commerce of RMB 1,841 b in 2013.


Can online market grow as estimated? Specifically, can Alibaba continue to maintain its already dominant market share? Chances are lower on the latter, accordingly, we can expect the share to steadily come down in the years to come.

Operating margins
Alibaba's operating margins have improved from 25-30% range to the present margin of 48.1%. It is also unlikely that such a large operating margin can be sustained for long.

We can expect a few things going forward:
  1. China online market will continue to grow.
  2. Alibaba market share (GMV) will continue to slide from 84% to a lower, yet probably significant, share.
  3. Its gross margin (revenues as percent of GMV) is 2.6% at present; we cannot expect it to improve significantly.
  4. It will be difficult to sustain high operating margins for long; they will slide.
  5. No dividends will be in sight; Alibaba will have to spend lots in reinvestment each year.
  6. After a decade or so, it is more practicable to assume that both the total market and Alibaba will grow at a modest rate. In fact Alibaba should show signs of a mature firm. It could generate sustainable cash flows, pay dividends and do buy-backs, and have capacity to borrow more.
$200 b tech giant
Alibaba is soon likely to become one of the tech giants in the world.


However, there may be some gaps in this process of wealth creation.

I tried but concluded that to get to the value of $200 b Alibaba will have to do a lot of things - generate huge revenues and maintain margins.

The main issue is that we cannot attach high market share and high operating margins to Alibaba for too long. They will have to fall to a much reasonable and comfortable levels. And when we do that the result is a high implied growth rate to get to $200 b value of its common equity.

To know why consider this: Even when I let Alibaba enjoy reasonable excess returns until perpetuity (which I usually deter) during the stable growth period, I get year 10 revenues of $87 b. To get the right perspective we should translate those revenues into Alibaba's GMV and then into China GMV, and check whether the overall market (China GMV) appears to be achievable.

Two things to remember: There are caps on stable growth (perpetuity) period numbers; a firm cannot go on doing great things forever. Even during those great things period where growth is high it does not come free; the firm has to reinvest proportionately to achieve that growth. That reinvestment keeps a check on free cash flows.

Finally, it will be good to ask a few questions: how sustainable is this China story? Will there be any hiccups? For how long Tencent, Baidu, Amazon, eBay and others will let Alibaba keep those extraordinary returns? Are there any what if questions?

It has been thus so far: Jack Ma envisages and Joseph Tsai executes. Can these two make it to the next level?

Friday, August 1, 2014

flipkart gets global attention

The firm and its value
Flipkart was founded in 2007 spending Rs.400,000 on set-up costs. Today it is being valued at about $7 b (Rs.420 b) as a result of its recent capital raising. At least for these new capital providers the investment is about that big. 

That brings us to find out what kind of returns these investors are seeking. If we go by what the founders have in mind, that is about $100 b value in the next 10 years, the return is 30%. In 5 years it is 70%. Not bad, only if that happens.

Flipkart works with merchants to sell through its online platform (hosting third-party sellers) and earns a fee on sale. It is reported that the revenues last year were about $1 b and expected revenues this year are about $3 b; the growth is phenomenal. 

The market and its share
Nomura expects online retailing in India to reach $23 b in the next 4 years. China's e-commerce sales are pegged at $180 b currently which is 9% of the country's retail of $2,000 b, whereas India's online retail is less than 1% of total retail of $500 b. However, some expect that in the next 20 years it would be about 20% online. As per this report, online retail in India will reach $76 b by 2021 (that is 7 more years).

So it comes to two things: 1) Estimate the total retail market in the next 10-20 years; and 2) Estimate Flipkart's share in that market.

Revenues and margins
While revenues are growing, online retailers in India are not showing any profits yet. Revenues are one thing, but what really counts is the bottom line. Retail is a tough business. After all the years Amazon is not that profitable.

So how much can Flipkart get to where the barriers of entry are not that much? Amazon, eBay, Snapdeal, there could be many more in the competition, both local and global. 

Expecting that Flipkart would become profitable soon (how soon is estimation) is a reasonable assumption. However, the operating margins of online retailers are not very high. We can assign 5% pretax operating margin and 3.5% net margin. At present this is negative for the Indian online retailers. Return on capital for Walmart is about 16% and for Amazon is about 40%. Where would Flipkart be?

The $7 b value 
With starting revenues of $1 b, operating margin of 5% and return on capital of 25%, and a modest cost of capital, expected revenues in the year 11 would have to be $97 b for Flipkart to justify a valuation of $7 b today. I am assuming here that Flipkart is profitable from now itself which is not the case. There is also the assumption of the stable growth period where growth and margins are capped to more reasonable (stable) figures. The model shows that all the value is driven during the stable growth period because of heavy reinvestment that would be required during the high-growth period. Forget dividends; there aren't going to be any. In fact, Flipkart would have to raise capital a few more times during the period.

Amazon's revenues for 2013 were $74 b and for Walmart they were $466 b. From $1 b to $97 b in 10 years the revenues of Flipkart will have to grow at 58% annually. If the expected return (cost of capital) is higher (take your pick), revenues will have to grow at an astronomical rate; this is because revenues of $97 b will not be enough to justify $7 b. 

Of course, we can change any of the inputs and justify that, and that is left to anyone. 

Now, if we assume that in the next 10 years the Indian online retail market would be that of China's current, i.e. $180 b, Flipkart's share in the revenue would be about 54%. Can it pull it off? We just heard that Amazon is going to invest $2 b in its Indian retail operations. 

Alternatively, if we assume that Flipkart is not going to be profitable anytime soon, the model has to be revised. If we expect that it should take about 5 years to get to profitability, the minimum earnings will have to be about $1 b until perpetuity to get $7 b of market value of its equity. This assumes that Flipkart is in a stable growth phase until perpetuity which is really not the case, but the point is that you need those earnings to justify that value. Walmart had $17 b of earnings in 2013 and Amazon had $274 m.

The moral
The moral of the story is that I cannot value these firms since there are too many expectations to have beyond the boundaries. Having said all this it is kudos to Flipkart for getting global attention.