dollar or rupee, where to invest

The Indian rupee has touched Rs.70 per dollar now. The price of everything is determined by its demand and supply. It's that simple. If the demand for dollar goes up in relation to rupee, obviously the dollar's price relative to the rupee will increase. There may be a number of reasons why demand is up or down: trade requirements, inflation, interest rates, or even speculation, or just anything for that matter. But the basic premise does not change. Currently there are more buyers of dollar than rupee. Until the equation changes, the exchange rates will be in favor of the dollar.

But then, the equation has not changed for a long time. By the end of 1990, a dollar cost Rs.18.136. By the time 2017 ended, rupee was down about 71.59%; that's what happened in a 27-year period. To put into perspective, Rs.1000 bought $55.14 worth of products and services at the beginning of 1991; and by the beginning of 2018, it could buy only $15.66 worth. If you are one of those who needs dollars periodically to make payments, you have been in trouble. Reverse is true for those who have been receiving dollars for their services.

The rupee has always been beaten by the dollar. By 1995, its loss was 12.40% on an annual basis since 1990; by 2000, it lost 9.02% per annum; by 2005, 5.88%. Its first notable gain (5.10%) against the dollar for the year was in 2003 when it ended Rs.45.625 per dollar. The next year it gained 5.49% again. As 2007 ended, rupee seemed to be in demand closing at Rs.39.405. It was to however see its biggest fall in a year (18.95%) in 2008 at Rs.48.620. The rupee gained somewhat in the subsequent two years. But more than 15% loss in 2011 and more than 11% loss in 2013 brought the rupee to Rs.61.810. In fact, it gained 6.45% in 2017 only to stare at Rs.70 per dollar now.

Although the year on year changes have been erratic and non-linear, it is fair to say that the rupee gets rated downward in relation to the dollar every year by about 5% over long term. That's the cost of being in rupees as opposed to dollars. Inflation is a real tax on currencies. If the purchasing power of rupee goes down 7% each year because of inflation, and that of dollar by 2%, the relative prices of both currencies should reflect that. If they don't, eventually market forces will ensure that. That's what has been happening for the last two and half decades at least; remember the rupee's fall of over 70%. 

If an investor put money in the Nifty-50 as 1991 began, the annual return over 27 years would be 13.64%. If the investor was based out of India, that should suffice. But if someone based out of the US had invested when the exchange rate was Rs.18.136, the annual return would be 8.46% because of the 2017 closing rate of Rs.63.840. A similar investment for the US investor in the S&P-500 earned 8.06% over the 27-year period. If an Indian investor was able to invest rupees in the US index, the return would be 13.21% adjusted to the exchange rates. It is probably fair because the investment return largely makes up for the difference in inflation rates in both the countries.

In short, the US (dollars) investor in India should look at making at least 5% more than what is possible back home. And the Indian (rupee) investor in the US should be ok if the returns from the US investments are 5% lower than what is possible in India. That is an even-steven situation. The interest rate parity explains it. However, investors cross boundaries and take additional risks to make more than what is otherwise possible. Therefore, I think factoring in a 5% depreciation of the rupee against the dollar on a yearly basis is helpful. Of course over shorter periods anything is possible, but it is not possible to predict it.

For rupee to strengthen against dollar, Indians will have to collect more dollars (through trade and business) than they have to pay. The net dollars collected are then sold to convert into rupees increasing its demand. Reducing inflation differential will be useful in the long term. Two possible, but not plausible, scenarios are reducing gold and oil imports. The first one is a habitual problem, and the second one is not controllable. So 5% is what I am willing to go with. 

tcs, and its glory

TCS is planning a buyback worth Rs.160 b at a price of Rs.2,100 per share. That should reduce its March 2018 cash to Rs.272 b. Never mind the current cash position, it's only 3 months since after all. Let's work with the March 2018 numbers. It had 1914 m shares then; subsequently in May 2018, it carried out a 1:1 bonus; so there are 3828 m shares outstanding as of now. After the buyback they will be 76.1 m lower. Is Rs.2,100 a fair price for the stock? There are two things necessary to do a buyback: First, it should have excess cash which TCS has in plenty. Second, the price should be lower than its intrinsic value. If not, the selling shareholders will benefit. That is a conundrum for both the managers and shareholders. What the heck is the value per share of the stock? The market price is about Rs.2,000 now. 

TCS had revenues of Rs.1,231 b in 2018. More than 80% of that comes from Americas and Europe. It serves the services sector much more than the manufacturing sector, with leadership in banking, finance and insurance space.

The revenues increased by 14% and 18% annually in the past 5 and 10 years respectively. However, it did clock its lowest revenue growth in a decade at 4.36% last year. Is that any indication? In fact in 2017 also the revenue growth was lower than double digits. 

TCS does not spend much on research and development. It is about 1% of revenues. I prefer not to make any adjustment to its operating profits. Operating margins are pretty stable at around 25%. Earnings per share was Rs.25.68 (2008), Rs.70.99 (2013), and Rs.134.91 (2018); these are all pre-bonus numbers. It had a double digit growth in the past 5- and 10-year periods. Yet, the growth was as low as 1.12% for 2018. This was despite a buyback of 56 b shares at a pre-bonus price of Rs.2,850 per share in May 2017. Since then the stock has gained 40% to date; the buyback turned out to be a bargain for the existing shareholders. Net margins have also been stable at around 20%. Return on capital and equity have remained very healthy. It had a book debt of Rs.2.5 b, and lease debt of Rs.37 b. Yeah, TCS has some non-cancellable operating leases. 

How much can its EPS grow in the next 10 years, for instance? Adjusted to May 2018 bonus, if it grows at 10%, it will be Rs.175 per share after a decade. At a multiple of 25 as a reward for growth, the market price will be Rs.4,375, giving an annual return of 7.25% for the period. Make it 9.50% including dividends. Are we happy with that rate? What are the alternative opportunities available? What if the growth rate is 7%? Well, the return also will be lower at about 4.25% including dividends, assuming a lower multiple of 20 for lower growth. That's the risk all equities carry. 

Historically TCS has been priced at higher price-to-fcff multiples. Let's assume that a multiple of 20 is fair as it stands today as an aging information technology services business, and that its average free cash flows annually are Rs.200 b. If these free cash flows grow at 10% annually over the next decade, our expected return from the stock will be about 7.55% for the period.

I also did a dcf valuation for the business. At its current price, the implied rate of return for the stock is 7.36% based on my assumptions regarding growth rates and reinvestment of course. 

If our expected returns are higher than 10%, we need to expect higher growth rates in revenues, earnings, and cash flows from the business. Is that possible? TCS managers have found Rs.2,100 as a fair price for the share buyback; may be they know more about its story than we do. 

TCS was available at Rs.709 b in 2008, at its low price. In 2013, the low price for the business was Rs.2,082 b. Today it is priced more than Rs.7,500 b. That's hypothetical because Tata Sons owns more than 70% of the business; and it ain't going to sell. In addition, TCS paid out a total of Rs.663 b in cash dividends in the last decade. Of course it has been a super business. Whether TCS and its peers in India are aging IT services businesses which have matured already, or there is more innovation and growth in store is the question before the analysts.

portfolio set up, and strategies

I usually don't offer any advice unless asked for. I am careful about the fact that much free advice is just that, and pretty useless. Sometimes I use the word you in my posts, but generally, it denotes more of I or we than you. Much of this blogpost is a collection of my thought process, and how I like to conduct myself rather than telling others about what to do. If I have not succeeded in conveying that it is probably a shortcoming, which I hope to correct in the coming times. In short, I really don't care what others do, just as I know that others don't care what I do. It is like as someone said: don't tell your problems to others because the half don't care and the rest are happy that you have them. Such is the world. It is better to be the master of your fate and captain of your soul, yourself. Be the Invictus.

Here's how I set up my investment portfolio. Needless to say it again, yet, I don't care what others do for themselves. I have a three-layered structure. 

The first one consists of high quality stocks bought at reasonable prices compared to their sustainable long term competitive advantages. I buy them for keeps irrespective of their current prices, top or low. The intention is to be a part owner of those businesses and enjoy the ride with them. The expectation is to earn decent compounding returns over a long period of time. The portfolio consists of 5-10 stocks. I don't believe in extreme diversification. Obviously, there isn't much of thrill or fun in this, as it should be. When I seek it, I go to my third portfolio. And obviously, a large portion of my cash is allocated here. 

The second one is about investing for not very long. The stocks that I buy are meant for any time from a year or two. The cap is three years. There are plenty of stocks that will be available at prices that are considered to be a bargain, and are likely to yield more than market returns in a short period of time. This is to take advantage of market's folly and profit from it. Although there is no limit to the number of stocks that I buy, usually I restrict to less than 10 stocks. The number is more likely to be 5 than 10. These are not meant for long term, and therefore are not necessarily of high quality stocks. Nevertheless, because by nature I am more conservative, I tend to pick only those stocks which are not low quality businesses. I also avoid those which have disproportionate debts. There are some sectors that I avoid no matter how attractive the prices look to me. A year is a long term and a three-year period is a very long term for the most in the market, and this itself offers opportunities to me to earn reasonable returns over the period. Research for this keeps me busy and excited. Because of the number of stocks that represent this portfolio, there aren't much of buys and sells, only just enough of them to align with the objective. 

The third portfolio is more of fun and excitement. This involves buying stocks meant to sell them in less than a year. It is not possible to do this all the time, but mostly the cap is a year. The sells can happen in a few days to a few months. A few months is an apt period for this activity. Needless to say, I am not a day trader. I don't look at charts, etc. because I find them boring. The idea here is to make money when the markets are volatile. The idea is to have some fun and games as the markets unfold by the day. Usually I get to pay my bills through this, although nothing is guaranteed. No free lunches all the time, remember. And obviously, a very small portion of my stash is allocated to this. 

Frankly, I have too much of leisure. Despite running a three-pronged portfolio, the amount of transactions that I do is very limited. There aren't buys or sells for days together. There aren't meaningful buys for months together. I value businesses that I never mean to buy for instance, just for fun. It gives me an idea as to how businesses should not be run. The leisure time is meant for anything: reading up on the businesses (research), business books, story books, or going out, or spending the day in praise of idleness, or anything for that matter. Dealing with greed, fear, and envy in a manner that should be has been very helpful for me in having fun. 

I find markets exciting is an understatement. I consider myself a student of business, finance, and markets. An earnest student of this exciting game. I am also aware that much of the investment success, or even life's success is attributed to some luck, without which we render ourselves to be both arrogant and useless. Some humility is good. 

reliable valuation is a farce

Predicting the future is a waste of time

Someone said he was not good at prediction, especially the future. Well it applies to everyone, but not many accept it. That is why soothsayers and fortunetellers flourish. If there is demand, supply is automatic and natural. Nevertheless, investing in stocks requires knowing the future. We are talking about investors, not speculators and traders. Since a stock represents its underlying business, knowing the value of that business before making investments is imperative. 

Intrinsic value of a business

The value of a business is essentially the present value of all of its future cash flows using an appropriate discount rate. That may sound profound because it is. If it were straightforward, a worksheet would make people rich. All you require as input data are the cash flows until liquidation of the business and a discount rate to bring them to the present value. 

To make life a little simpler, we break down the lifespan of the business in two parts: One, a selected period comprising the number of years we expect the business to grow and to be able to estimate its cash flows, and Two, the stable period representing the rest of the lifespan. The common periods being used are: 10 years of business growth, and then a stable-growth period. Now we need inputs relating to the growth rates over 10 years and then a stable growth rate. The whole exercise involves estimating revenues, operating margins, and reinvestment. It requires estimating debt, including off-balance sheet. We may even have to estimate possible equity dilutions, and this can get complicated by the grant of stock options. Any claims against the business from the non-equity holders will have to be considered as well. There are more. 

Even when we want to keep things simple, we require at least a few estimates to arrive at the free cash flows: 1) The expected growth rate in revenues for the next 10 years; 2) The expected operating margins, and therefore operating profits over the next 10 years; 3) The expected reinvestment required to sustain the expected growth; 4) A stable growth rate assuming that the business will grow at a constant rate perpetually; 5) The stable period operating margins, profits, and reinvestment. 

The past growth rates and near-future prospects usually are a guide for estimating the future growth rates and operating margins. A cap on the business growth considering the whole economy is helpful in estimating the stable period growth. The internal consistency in our calculations helps us estimate the reinvestment required. Yet, these are estimates, and all estimates miss actual numbers reported by the business. Analysts then blame the managers for not meeting their estimates; and that calls for an ugh. Investors are left either amused or let down by their own estimates turning turkeys. 

It's a farce

I have been valuing businesses for a long time, and I know what it means to use a discounted cash flow approach to value a stock. But then I also know its demerits. When every single estimate used is going to miss the actual, is there a point in doing the whole calculation? And what's this stable-period business business? For a high-growth business, like Amazon, most of the value comes from the stable period, which may not be a true reflection of its forthcoming proceedings. We falter when we use a constant growth period after say, 10 years and the business moves on to grow at different rates over say, the subsequent 10-year period. For a mature business, the other way around is true, where most of the value will be front loaded, and the perpetual-growth value will be a small portion of it. But who knows when businesses such as Maruti Suzuki, Bharti Airtel, and Kotak bank, for instance, will become mature? We cannot use say, 4% perpetual growth rate after 10 years, if they can grow significantly higher in the 11-to-20 year period. Die-hard fans of DCF claim that the present value of the second decade cash flow will not be much to impact the total intrinsic value of the business. They are wrong because it will, if the growth rates are significantly different. They also advice using a second growth period, say the second decade, if required. Again as someone said, is there a perverse human behavior that likes to make simple things complicated?

Analysts and investors dealing with the multiples such as earnings, book, and revenues are cheating themselves if they thought they are valuing the business. They are not because the multiples are a pricing mechanism. They might come in handy to them, but these multiples if used intrinsically should yield the response similar to a DCF valuation, because after all, each multiple is reflective of the cash flows, growth rate, and the risks of the business. 

The hack

What's it then, can we not value a business at all? Where's the alternative? The first thing I have found is that dealing with perpetuity is both a pain and foolish. So I chuck the assumption of the stable growth period. Now we have only a selected future period for which estimates will have to be made. We still need cash flows and growth rates for that period. Because these cash flows aren't the entire stash of the business, we cannot use DCF to value the business. We will have to pick a pricing tool to estimate the price of the business. But central to this theme is I don't want to use my own estimate of the price. How do I know for sure that the business is worth 25 times earnings or 3 times book, for instance? 

Instead I want the market to tell me what the business is worth as per its own estimates and pricing. My life then becomes much easier. All I have to do is deal with the market in terms of buy, sell, or no action. Here's the vital piece of the model: The market gives me the clue as to whether the business is priced significantly higher, significantly lower, or reasonably priced. I will know it estimating the market implied growth rates in earnings, book value, or cash flows. Earnings are more important than revenues; but earnings can be manipulated. Cash flows are much better than earnings. Accounting rules can trick earnings, but not cash flows. Here's another point: I will never know the actual intrinsic value of the business. But thank heavens, I don't need to know it. All I need is the market's estimates during my investment period, and my own knowledge about the business. The key is to assess whether the absurdity in pricing is apparent. It is not important to know by how much because that is not possible without having an accurate value for the business. As long as the price appears to be absurd and out of sync with the business fundamentals, there's a case for either a buy or a sell decision.

I believe that wherever humans are involved we will find some sort of inefficiencies, which often take to some absurd levels. The financial markets aren't an exception; they happen all the time there, but at different points. The overall market may be reasonably priced, but a specific stock may be significantly underpriced, for instance. For a careful investor, observing this game from a distance gives opportunities for profit. All the investor has to do is to play the game by own terms, not giving in to the market's stunts. The game is more behavioral than mathematical. 

Apple reached $1 t market value yesterday. Since this is a fact, the potential investor has to find out what's in store for him in future. Apple's annual numbers are a couple of months away. But we know that it generated average free cash flows to firm of $45 b during the past (2013-2017) five years. It also had net cash of $153 b as of September 2017, not very different from what it reported for June 2018. The free cash flows peaked in 2015 to $66 b; for 2017, they were $41 b. We don't have to estimate the cash flows during each of the next say, 5 years. Let markets do that work. We know that the growth rates have been erratic in the past. However based on the current pricing, the markets are telling us that if these cash flows grow 5% annually, and if they are priced 18 times at the 5th year, we can make 10% annually over the 5-year period. The markets have brought their estimates of the 5-year cash flows to the present value using a discount rate of 10%. Now we have some clue regarding our decision as to whether to buy, sell, or ignore the market offering. This, I have understood, gives me the comfort in making decisions rather than simply input the numbers on the worksheet and bring out the present value. We will have to assess whether the growth rates are significantly higher or lower than that are sustainable for Apple as a business. It is still heavily dependent upon iPhones; none of its new products have been that encouraging. There is a fair amount of judgment involved in making the decision, but at least here we are challenging the market's estimates rather than making our own. We also have to check if 10% returns sound interesting to us. We can also juggle around with the growth rates and pricing multiple to arrive at the current market value of the business. It's not difficult to catch insanity in the market's assumptions. 

By the way, I still love doing that DCF stuff, why I valued Apple, Facebook, and Alphabet only yesterday. It is fun, and just that; I love it. I don't make any investment decisions based on DCF anymore, although if done accurately, DCF is the only model to calculate the intrinsic value of a cash-flow-throwing asset. But then the catch is we cannot do it accurately. Why lie to ourselves then?

That does not stop business managers and their investment advisors in pulling out complex worksheets and fancy presentations to compensate for the hollow math. That is how the mergers and acquisitions take place anyway. As I said when there is demand, supply will find its place. Managers look grand, and advisors make money on most acquisitions. The joke is, if you keep lying to yourself about something, you will eventually start believing it. Repetition works like magic in here too. My advice though is that don't try it. 

icici, or you don't see, is the question

ICICI posted its latest quarter results. Expectations you can say, and the stock, prior to the announcement, jumped 2.31% to Rs.292.25 per share. What you are going to see on Monday is anyone's guess, after all, the bank has posted its quarterly loss in a very long time. But then it could have done that past quarter or even past year. If you acknowledge bad assets, you gotta throw them into the expenses box, and if you delay doing that, a day will come to force you into it. Didn't I tell ya? That's that; what about it now? There will be a number of opinions on buy or sell. Here's my take.

The results aren't that bad actually. Rs.61 b net interest income was better than the previous quarter and much better than the previous year's same quarter. Fee income of Rs.27 b was good enough. Most banks have had to take the hit on their treasury portfolio due to the interest rate mechanisms. ICICI chose to book them all in this quarter. Last quarter showed robust treasury profits of Rs.26 b; previous year's same quarter had Rs.8 b profits. This quarter's Rs.7 b from treasuries is only modest, because there was Rs.10 b gains from Prudential Life Insurance stake sale; without stake sale, the losses would be higher. The operating profits stood like this: Rs.51.84 b during June 2017 quarter, Rs.75.14 b during March 2018, and Rs.58.08 b during June 2018. But then the bank took almost Rs.60 b in provisioning charges during the quarter leading to its historic quarterly loss on a standalone basis. Is that a bravo moment?

There are enough credits due to the bank and is legacies. It has always been a pioneer in looking at the growth prospects and adopting systems, technology, and procedures to cater to it. Other banks might have wanted to do the same, but well after ICICI embarked on it. As for now though, the bank is facing some tough times. 

For a bank, there are a few important metrics based on which we should deal with them. Return on assets measures how efficiently the bank is run considering its invested capital. Return on equity is how much its shareholders are going to get based on their investment. Both are important, but more important is how large is the debt compared to its equity capital. A disproportionate debt size can lead the bank into bankruptcy even after a small portion of its assets go bad. In this respect, ICICI bank is well positioned. With Tier 1 capital of over 15%, the bank is strong enough to look at credit growth. Its cost of funds and cost to income are acceptable. With average CASA of 46.10%, its costs of funds should remain stable. There is a drop in its net interest margin to 3.19%, and it must hope not to take it down any further. 

Even after heavy provisioning the quarter, the bank has about Rs.258 b in non-performing assets, which is over 4.50% in net NPAs. These are of course the result of making some bad decisions in the past; lending is a serious business. The bank also has some Rs.14 b in restructured assets. If we clean up its balance sheet, and thereby its equity, we get a book value of Rs.129.83. The stock isn't cheap. 

For an investor to make money on this stock, the bank has to show credit growth with a low ratio of bad assets. A 15% growth rate, and a year's time, I don't see much happening with this stock. A two-year wait, and you might get better than risk-free rates. Over three years there is a good chance that the bank will turnaround and the investor will get a fair deal.

But as we know, who has the patience to wait, isn't that a bad virtue?

what can you do in these markets

Let's talk about the Indian markets. The Nifty-50 is on a roll. It is selling for more than 27 times earnings, more than 3.50 times book, and has a very low dividend yield. Despite being volatile, the index is quite pricey. 

As usual the talking-heads have been giving their shit cents. They have to remain active you see, otherwise people will forget them soon. They desperately need attention to survive. It's another story that these people have to talk, write, and then seek money from others to pay their bills. Unfortunately, naive investors (or traders should we say?) don't get it, and fall for them. 

Here's some unsolicited advice for them. It is not difficult to feed your needs; but quite impossible to feed your greed. Learn to differentiate, and you are on to something. 

Investing in stocks is akin to owning businesses. If you started a hardware business in your hometown, would you be looking to exit in a few months or even a few years? Check reasons, and you will find that owning a stock does not mean you should sell in months. There is a business behind each stock. Learn about it, and see if it has good prospects. No one got richer overnight. If overnight is what you like, let me put it this way: You need to put in a lot of years before you can get rich overnight. If you can show patience in your hardware business, you might as well show patience after you buy a Nestle, Maruti, or ICICI bank stock. After all, they are all into some business which takes time to grow in a meaningful way. Participate in that growth story.

The best recommendation I can give to anyone including those self-proclaimed expert stock pickers is that buying the index and getting the market returns is not a bad thing. In fact, it should be a pretty good thing to do. Throw cash each month, irrespective of markets being expensive or cheap, into that index, and keep going for as long as you can. Time will then take care of both returns and risk. Ignore other people's opinions; they need your cash more than you need their advice. Let those shit-heads be. 

Of course if you are a stock picker, you could utilize the volatile times to learn about businesses, how they make money in low and high markets, how they allocate capital, what debt they have, their competitive advantages, and so forth. Then wait for the time when others are in a panic mode to make your buy decisions. There will be plenty of such occasions. But to profit from them, you need to learn to wait. The opposite is true when you want to make sell decisions. The irrational exuberance prevailing in the markets is the time to exit if at all you need to exit. 

Nevertheless, the real money is made thus: Buy quality stocks which have long term competitive advantages at reasonable prices, and hold them for as long as those advantages are sustainable. Stick with them in bad times and good times, stick with them in expensive and cheap markets. In a decade or two, this strategy should make enough money for you. 

And yeah, get rid of that emotion called envy, for it will only make you miserable like my cousin who despite earning well, saving well, and having enough, always finds himself talking about how others are making too much money. For me, he looks like an asshole. My advice to all is, don't be him. Learn to live life because it is fun all the way.

the k-banks story

Kotak bank announced results yesterday, and Karnataka bank did so a few days back. Post results, the Kotak bank stock closed down from Rs.1398.55 to Rs.1347.40 per share; and the Karnataka bank stock closed down from Rs.124.10 to Rs.114.50. A more than 7% fall for the smaller bank and less than 4% for the bigger one. Was it justified?

On 16 July 2018, Kotak bank had hit a high of Rs.1417 from its yearly low of Rs.962; that's a phenomenal performance for the investors. In comparison, Karnataka bank hit a low of Rs.105.10 on 28 June 2018 from its high of Rs.171.60 less than a year ago. 

In terms of financial performance, management, and growth prospects, Kotak bank is way superior. But what about the future returns for the investors? For Rs.2,133 b advances, a 1.95% of bad assets is exceptional. After considering non-performing assets, the book value for Kotak bank stands at Rs.264.86 per share. At the current price of Rs.1347.40, it is trading at more than 5 times the book value. This itself should put investors on caution. Remember, the higher the buy price, the lower the potential return. This applies to all businesses including the high quality ones. Let us assume that it will grow by 15% annually in the next 3 years. Even at the exit book multiple of 4, the investment returns would be less than 6.25% including dividends. At 20% growth, the returns would be just short of 11%; wait, when you reduce the exit book multiple to 3.50, the returns fall to about 6%. 

The Karnataka bank story is un poco diferente. With non-performing assets of almost 5% on Rs.477 b advances, much lower return on assets and equity, much higher debt-to-equity, and much lower regulatory capital, the bank is of course inferior in terms of business quality. Yet, the stock is available for less than its book value, adjusted for bad assets, per share. With a 5% growth, and an exit book multiple of 1, the stock returns should be over 12% in 2 years. A little better growth, and you are off to something. Do you want to take it?

Do you see the game now, how it is diced? Take your growth expectations, take your exit multiples, and play along; a la la la la long.